The Roberts Court today managed to restrict the rights of Americans yet again today, as they announced their decision in Morse v. Frederick (PDF).
Joseph Frederick displayed a banner with the message “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” as the Olympic torch went through Juneau, Alaska, in 2002. Because it was a “school-sanctioned event,” principal Deborah Morse suspended Frederick for his “pro-drug message,” despite Frederick’s protestations that the banner was meant simply as a nonsense phrase; he had seen it on a snowboard and thought it was funny.
As you might have expected, the Roberts Court handed down a 5-4 decision in favor of the principal in this important First Amendment case, despite the surprising opposition of “conservative groups that often are allied with the administration,” which “are backing Frederick out of concern that a ruling for Morse would let schools clamp down on religious expression, including speech that might oppose homosexuality or abortion.”
For those interested, here is the holding of the Court, as presented in the syllabus of the slip opinion (PDF):
Held: Because schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use, the school officials in this case did not violate the First Amendment by confiscating the pro-drug banner and suspending Frederick. Pp. 5–15.
(a) Frederick’s argument that this is not a school speech case is rejected. The event in question occurred during normal school hours and was sanctioned by Morse as an approved social event at which the district’s student-conduct rules expressly applied. Teachers and administrators were among the students and were charged with supervising them. Frederick stood among other students across the street from the school and directed his banner toward the school, making it plainly visible to most students. Under these circumstances, Frederick cannot claim he was not at school. Pp. 5–6.
(b) The Court agrees with Morse that those who viewed the banner would interpret it as advocating or promoting illegal drug use, in violation of school policy. At least two interpretations of the banner’s words—that they constitute an imperative encouraging viewers to smoke marijuana or, alternatively, that they celebrate drug use—demonstrate that the sign promoted such use. This pro-drug interpretation gains further plausibility from the paucity of alternative meanings the banner might bear. Pp. 6–8.
(c) A principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, the Court declared, in holding that a policy prohibiting high school students from wearing antiwar armbands violated the First Amendment, id., at 504, that student expression may not be suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude that it will “materially and substantially disruptthe work and discipline of the school,” id., at 513. The Court in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, however, upheld the suspension of a student who delivered a high school assembly speech employing “an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor,” id., at 678. Analyzing the case under Tinker, the lower courts had found no disruption, and therefore no basis for discipline. 478 U.S., at 679–680. This Court reversed, holding that the school was “within its permissible authority in imposing sanctions . . . in response to [the student’s] offensively lewd and indecent speech.” Id., at 685. Two basic principles may be distilled from Fraser. First, it demonstrates that “the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.” Id., at 682. Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school context, he would have been protected. See, id., at 682–683. In school, however, his First Amendment rights were circumscribed “in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.” Tinker, supra, at 506. Second, Fraser established that Tinker’s mode of analysis is not absolute, since the Fraser Court did not conduct the “substantial disruption” analysis. Subsequently, the Court has held in the Fourth Amendment context that “while children assuredly do not ‘shed their constitutional rights. . . at the schoolhouse gate,’ … the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school,” Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 655–656, and has recognized that deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an “important—indeed, perhaps compelling” interest, id., at 661. Drug abuse by the Nation’s youth is a serious problem. For example, Congress has declared that part of a school’s job is educating students about the dangers of drug abuse, see, e.g., the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994, and petitioners and many other schools have adopted policies aimed at implementing this message. Student speech celebrating illegal drug use at a school event, in the presence of school administrators and teachers, poses a particular challenge for school officials working to protect those entrusted to their care. The “special characteristics of the school environment,” Tinker, 393 U. S., at 506, and the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting such abuse. Id., at 508, 509, distinguished. Pp. 8–15.
439 F. 3d 1114, reversed and remanded.
So fundie groups are worried that a decision for Morse (which is what we’ve got) “would let schools clamp down on religious expression, including speech that might oppose homosexuality or abortion?” Sounds like it’s time to make lemonade from lemons, eh?
UPDATE (12:48 pm 6/25/07): It gets worse. The Court, in another 5-4 decision today, also announced its opinion in Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. (PDF), where a group of individuals challenged the Bush crime syndicate’s concept of government funding of “faith-based initiatives.” Justice Alito, writing for a plurality, stated essentially that a taxpayer’s standing (i.e., legal permission to sue, in this case, the federal government) is limited to congressional expenditures pursuant to Art. I, sec. 8 of the Constitution.
Unbelievable, and sad.
The Biggest Asshole in Congress™, Sen. Ted Stevens (right), was indicted today on seven counts of fraud, federal charges related to renovations of his Alaska home. This comes two days shy of one year after federal agents raided his home as the investigation into Stevens’ alleged wrongdoing got underway.
Blast Off! in exile 